Defending Congress by Waxman, Seth P.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 79 | Number 4 Article 6
5-1-2001
Defending Congress
Seth P. Waxman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1073 (2001).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol79/iss4/6
ESSAY
DEFENDING CONGRESS
SETH P. WAXMAN*
Last year, the Attorney General received a letter from the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.1 The letter concerned the
position the United States had taken in a case then pending in the
Supreme Court styled Dickerson v. United States.2  The letter
questioned whether the decision of the Department of Justice in that
case not to defend the constitutionality of a 1968 law3 -a law that
sought to overrule the Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Miranda v.
Arizona4 -was consistent with the constitutional duty of the
Executive to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."5
The Speaker's letter surfaced an issue at the core of the Solicitor
General's responsibility-the responsibility to ascertain and represent
the interests of the United States in litigation. The issue is this: If the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress is challenged in court, when, if
ever, does the Solicitor General's responsibility permit, or require,
him not to defend the Act?
The issue is particularly salient these days because we are living
in a period of constitutional ferment. For most of our nation's
history, the Supreme Court only rarely struck down federal statutes
on constitutional grounds. Often, years went by without it happening
even once. The Court reiterated time and again that the "judicial
power to hold [an] act unconstitutional[] is an awesome responsibility
"Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. From September 1997
through January 2001, Professor Waxman served as Solicitor General of the United States.
This Essay is based on the text of the William P. Murphy Lecture delivered by the
Solicitor General on September 15, 2000, at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Marty
Lederman and Robyn Thiemann.
1. Letter from Dennis P. Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to Janet
Reno, Attorney General (Feb. 16, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
2. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
3. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 701(a), 82 Stat. 197, 210-11 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3502 (1994)).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
1074 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79
calling for the utmost circumspection in its exercise."6 During the
entire first 200 years following ratification of the Constitution, only
127 federal laws were struck down-even accounting for the many
laws that fell victim to the New Deal's head-on collision with the
Supreme Court in the tumultuous 1930s. 7
These days, however, the extraordinary act of one branch of
government declaring that the other two branches have violated the
Constitution has become almost commonplace. Since 1995, the Court
has invalidated twenty-six different federal enactments,8 and its
6. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 S. Ct. 1, 2 (1964); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462 (1965) ("This Court is always reluctant to
declare that an Act of Congress violates the Constitution, but is this case we have no
alternative."); The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878) ("One branch of the
government cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger."); Mayor v.
Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 251 (1867) ("This Court has the power to declare an Act of Congress
to be repugnant to the Constitution, and therefore invalid. But the duty is one of great
delicacy, and only to be performed where the repugnancy is clear, and the conflict
unreconcilable.").
7. The cases are listed chronologically in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmERICA-ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 2001-31 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1992) (Sup.
Doc. No. 103-6).
8. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. 1043, 1052 (2001) (striking down a
1996 amendment to the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 that prohibited LSC
recipients from using the federal funds received under this Act to challenge existing
welfare law as a violation of the First Amendment); Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct.
955, 967-68 (2001) (holding that a state employee may not sue a state in federal court for
state violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (holding that Congress may not enact legislation
superseding Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); United States v. Playboy Entm't
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (invalidating section 505 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000) (invalidating the civil
remedy provision in the Violence Against Women Act, which provided for victims of
gender-motivated bias); Kimel v. Ha. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000)
(invalidating the state immunity abrogation provisions of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (invalidating a
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 authorizing private actions against
states); College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
669 (1999) (concluding that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act cannot abrogate
state immunity); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 648 (1999) (invalidating provisions of the Patent Remedy Act because Congress
does not have the power to abrogate state immunity); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n
v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 1304's lottery
broadcasting prohibition as applied to gambling advertisements in states where gambling
is legal); Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998) (invalidating the Coal Industry
Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1993 as applied to the case); Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S.
417,448 (1998) (invalidating the Line Item Veto Act); United States v. United States Shoe
Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 363 (1998) (invalidating the Harbor Maintenance Tax on exports);
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340, 342 (1998) (holding that a jury trial
must be held despite the lack of a specific requirement under copyright infringement
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pending merits docket includes several other constitutional challenges
to federal statutes.9
Several theories have been advanced to explain this marked
recent trend: I do not propose to discuss any of them here. For
whatever reason, constitutional adjudication has undergone a
remedies laid out in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997)
(invalidating certain provisions of the Brady Act); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849
(1997) (invalidating two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 237 (1997) (invalidating
sections of the Indian Land Consolidation Act); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 733 (1996) (invalidating two provisions of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992); Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996) (invalidating one application of a
provision of the Federal Campaign Act of 1971), cert. granted sub nom. FEC v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000); United States v. IBM Corp., 517
U.S. 843, 845 (1996) (invalidating section 4371(1) of the Internal Revenue Code);
Seminole Tribe. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (invalidating a provision of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,551 (1995) (invalidating a
provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476,478 (1995) (invalidating a provision of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act);
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (invalidating a provision of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513
U.S. 454, 457 (1995) (invalidating a provision of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
9. Alexander v. Sandoval, No. 99-1908, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3367, *33 (U.S. Apr. 24,
2001) (holding that no implied private right to action exists to enforce administrative
regulations against a state agency); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328, 332 (2d Cir.
2000) (questioning whether Immigration Act amendments, which preclude aliens all
review of challenges to final removal orders, violate due process or the Suspension
Clause), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 849 (2001); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 213 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000) (questioning the constitutionality of section
441a(d)(3) of Federal Election Campaign Act), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000); Nguyen
v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 2000) (challenging a distinction in 8 U.S.C. § 1409
between out-of-wedlock children born overseas to parents who are United States citizens),
cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000); Hatter v. United States, 203 F.3d 795, 796 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en bane) (questioning the constitutionality of extending Medicare and Social
Security taxes to salaries of sitting Article III judges), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 338 (2000);
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1999) (challenging 18 U.S.C.
§ 2520(c)(2)(3), a section of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986), cert.
granted, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083,1086 (9th Cir.
1999) (contesting the constitutionality of Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001); United Foods, Inc. v. United States, 197 F.3d 221, 222 (6th
Cir. 1999) (challenging the constitutionality of assessments imposed by 1950 Mushroom
Promotion Research and Consumer Information Act), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 562 (2000);
Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1999) (questioning whether
prolonged, indefinite detention of aliens ordered deported pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6) violates the Constitution), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000); Ill. Bell Tel. Co.
v. Worldcom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1999) (questioning whether suit
against state commission under section 242(a)(6) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
violates sovereign immunity of Eleventh Amendment), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1224
(2001).
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thoroughgoing paradigm shift. My question is: How does, and
should, the shift affect the function of the Solicitor General?
Before I get right to the point-or rather to help me get to the
point-let me provide some context. Every year the Solicitor
General must decide, one case at a time, what the interests of the
United States are with respect to several thousand different cases in
the federal and state courts. Should the United States appeal, or seek
rehearing, or petition for certiorari, or file a brief amicus curiae, or
intervene? 10 What issues should the United States raise, and what
arguments should it make? How should the law be interpreted or the
doctrine applied? The goal is for the United States to speak with one
voice-a voice that reflects the interests of all three branches of
government and of the people. How on earth is that done? It is a
little like asking a millipede how it knows which foot to put first.
Many lofty statements have been uttered by my predecessors.
Solicitor General Frederick Lehmann wrote that "[t]he United States
wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts."'"
Simon Sobeloff reflected that "[t]he Solicitor General is not a neutral;
he is an advocate; but an advocate for a client whose business is not
merely to prevail in the instant case.... [N]ot to achieve victory, but
to establish justice. 12
Passages like that are inspirational. Perhaps they are even
reassuring, because in a sense they mean that even when the Solicitor
General loses a case, he wins. But they offer little in the way of
practical guidance. Reflecting on his tenure, Francis Biddle wrote
that, for the Solicitor General, "the client is but an abstraction. '13
I do not think that is quite right. But it is true that discerning the
interests of the United States as a client is a uniquely challenging and
rewarding responsibility. It is the most important responsibility the
Solicitor General has. And the key to doing it lies in process. Let me
explain what I mean.
Like judges, the Solicitor General is a reactive creature; every
decision he makes comes in the context of a specific request from a
Cabinet department, an independent agency, a United States
Attorney, or a litigating division of the Department of Justice. In
every instance, the process begins with a written analysis and
10. Officer of the Solicitor General: General Functions, 28 C.F.R. §§ .20-.21 (2000).
11. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JuSTICE 17 (1987) (quoting Solicitor General
Frederick Lehmann).
12. Simon E. Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government: The Work of the Solicitor
General's Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229,229 (1955).
13. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 97 (1962).
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recommendation, which is then circulated to every government
component that might conceivably have an interest in the matter.
These components in turn prepare their own analyses and share them
with each other. I recall cases from my tenure in which as many as a
dozen different agencies and components have expressed views.
After all of these memos are in, an Assistant to the Solicitor
General prepares an independent analysis and recommendation; a
Deputy writes another; and the entire package lands on the Solicitor
General's desk for decision. Ordinarily, between five and ten of these
recommendation packages arrive every day. Most are reasonably
straightforward, but sometimes the recommendations differ widely.
Meetings are convened in which representatives of each component
gather to consider each other's views, with the Solicitor General
trying to reconcile differences and fashion a single coherent position.
These meetings are about the most exciting and challenging thing
the Solicitor General gets to do. It is genuinely thrilling to
collaborate with a collection of dedicated government lawyers-each
of whom brings to the table the unique perspective of the component
he represents-for the purpose of trying to arrive at a position that
will fairly reflect the views of the United States as a whole.
Sometimes it just cannot be done. But in a surprisingly large
percentage of cases, a position can be developed that leaves everyone
satisfied-or at least equally dissatisfied. The beauty of the system is
that each government component reflects a unique conception of on
what constitutes the interest of the United States. In that way, the
government acts as a microcosm of the country as a whole, mirroring
the complexity and diversity of American views.
The process often includes advocacy by lawyers for other parties
to the litigation and sometimes by attorneys for other persons or
entities that are not directly involved with the litigation but
nonetheless have an interest in the case or the issue. The process
always involves the Solicitor General's independent evaluation of the
relative importance of each case and the cost of pursuing it. As a
party in about forty percent of all cases in the federal courts, the
United States appeals only a small fraction of the decisions it loses,
and it petitions for rehearing or certiorari only rarely. Solicitors
General understand the cataclysmic effects that a less-discriminating
process would have on the judicial system.
When an Act of Congress is challenged, the process remains
much the same, but the calculus alters somewhat. The situation
differs because a decision about how to respond to a constitutional
challenge implicates in the most direct way the Solicitor General's
2001] 1077
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responsibility to account for the interests of all three branches of
government.
In the unique context of a constitutional challenge to legislation,
the interests of the Congress and the Executive are generally pretty
clear: they have spoken. And as a result, at least when those
interests do not conflict with the Solicitor General's duty to the
courts, the Department of Justice defends Acts of Congress in all but
the rarest of cases. Except in two well-recognized circumstances,
which I will discuss momentarily, the Solicitor General generally
defends a law whenever professionally respectable arguments can be
made in support of its constitutionality. Unlike litigation decisions in
other cases, when an Act of Congress has been challenged, the
Solicitor General ordinarily puts a heavy thumb on the scale.
Vigorously defending congressional legislation serves the
institutional interests and constitutional judgments of all three
branches. It ensures that proper respect is given to Congress's policy
choices. It preserves for the courts their historic function of judicial
review. And it reflects an important premise in our constitutional
system-that when Congress passes a law and the President signs it,
their actions reflect a shared judgment about the constitutionality of
the statute. In the mine run of cases, it is fair to presume that the
Congress that passed the legislation and the President who signed it
were of the view that the law conformed to the Constitution as
construed by the Supreme Court. In such cases, Solicitors General
defer to Congress and the President's articulation of the
constitutional "interests of the United States," as reflected in the
enactment. They do not attempt to reach our own best view of a
statute's constitutionality; rather, they try to craft a defense of the law
in a manner that can best explain the basis on which the political
branches' presumed constitutional judgment must have been
predicated.14
14. Note the salient difference between a decision by the Executive not to defend an
Act of Congress from the analogous, but quite distinct, decision a President may make not
to enforce the law. For a seminal treatment of the issues surrounding the latter,
controversial practice, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 905, 927-29 (1990) (arguing that the Executive may appropriately decline to enforce
the law). But see Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws:
Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 1010-11 (1994) (arguing
that the Executive may decline to enforce only in rare cases). Unlike a decision not to
enforce a statute at all, the practice of "enforce but decline to defend" permits the will of
Congress to be honored in the first instance, allows the Executive Branch to make its
views known to the Court, and ordinarily places before the Court the opportunity to
resolve the constitutional dispute between the other two branches. Some commentators
argue that the enforce-but-decline-to-defend equilibrium represents in many cases
[Vol. 791078
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Let me provide an example some people chuckle to recall. In
1996, Congress passed a law known as the Communications Decency
Act."5  The law was enacted without hearings or committee
consideration. It imposed criminal penalties on anyone who made
available to minors on the Internet material that was "indecent" or
"patently offensive.' 1 6 The Act was challenged before two three-
judge district courts. All six judges found the law facially
unconstitutional in every respect." The Justice Department's Civil
Division recommended appeal to the Supreme Court, and my
predecessor as Solicitor General agreed. Having argued the case, I
can confirm that there is nothing quite like standing in front of the
Supreme Court to defend the constitutionality of a law that not a
single judge has ever found to be constitutional in any respect. The
United States did lose (although we garnered two votes for two-thirds
of the statute).'9  But our adversarial system of constitutional
adjudication was served. The United States' briefs served the
valuable purpose of articulating for the Supreme Court the strongest
possible rationale in support of constitutionality-a much stronger
case than anything that had been articulated by or to Congress.
Those arguments in turn prompted the parties challenging the statute
to hone and improve their own positions. And when the Court
concluded that the statute should be invalidated, it did so with
assurance that it had considered the very best arguments that could
be made in its defense.
Often, defending Acts of Congress leads the Solicitor General to
lean heavily on the Ashwander principle of construing a statute so as
constitutionalism at its best, because it forces the Executive Branch to put its money
where its (constitutional) mouth is and tests those views in the crucible of Supreme Court
litigation. See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally
Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 59 (2000) (arguing that President
Clinton's refusal to defend an HIV law was the best course of action). Seen in that light, it
is much less risky than the refuse-to-enforce paradigm, which courts the peril that the
Executive will use the Constitution as a pretext for what are, in fact, policy disagreements
with a statute. Whatever objections one might make under the Take Care Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 3, to a practice of nonenforcement, those concerns are virtually
nonexistent in the nondefense context, since both the Executive and the Legislature
ultimately abide by the Court's constitutional ruling.
15. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a) and (d) to (h) (1994 and Supp. IV 1998)).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B).
17. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 1113 (1997);
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,849 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844,849 (1997).
18. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 922; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849.
19. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 886-97 (1997) (Rehnquist, CJ., and O'Connor, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
107920011
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to avoid constitutional doubt." One recent example involved the
construction we advocated for the so-called "automatic stay"
provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.2' In courts across the
country, every prisoner who challenged that provision, and every
State that defended it, agreed that the statute requires, inexorably,
that decrees in prison reform cases be suspended ninety days
following a motion to terminate them-no matter how complex the
case may be or how busy the district judge may be.
The United States intervened in all of these cases to defend the
constitutionality of the provision in question. We urged courts to
reject the strict reading advocated by all of the parties and instead to
interpret the provision to continue to permit courts, in extraordinary
instances, to exercise their traditional equitable powers. Two of the
three courts of appeals that considered the question adopted our
interpretation and sustained the statute on that ground.' The
Seventh Circuit rejected our interpretation and struck down the
statute.' The Supreme Court disagreed with everyone. Although it
rejected the United States' proffered interpretation, it did uphold the
statute.24 Reading Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court, one can
see that we got at least 100 style points for our effort at statutory
construction.2
Sometimes, in its zeal to defend Acts of Congress the
Department of Justice outdoes even itself. Five years ago, a case was
filed in federal court in Minnesota challenging the constitutionality of
some longstanding provisions of the Medicare and Medicaid Acts.26
These provisions gave special treatment to Christian Science nursing
services in sanatoria "operated, or listed and certified, by the First
Church of Christ, Scientist, Boston, Massachusetts."'27 (Yes, even the
20. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("When
the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,... it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.").
21. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000) (upholding a provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
22. Ruiz v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 385,387 (5th Cir. 1999); Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925,
930 (6th Cir. 1998).
23. French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 446 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd sub nom. Miller v.
French, 530 U.S. 327,350 (2000).
24. Miller, 530 U.S. at 350.
25. Id. at 341.
26. Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Vladeck, 938 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D.
Minn. 1996) (challenging provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1395 covering medical expenses at
Christian Science facilities), cert. denied sub nom. Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty,
Inc. v. McMullan, 121 S. Ct. 1483 (2001).
27. Id. at 1469 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (1994)).
1080 [Vol. 79
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address of the Church was listed in the United States Code.) The
Department's Civil Division fought valiantly in the district court to no
avail.' But when the case came to my predecessor for authorization
to appeal, he considered it a bridge just too far to cross.
This is not to say that the Department's trial lawyers crossed any
ethical line in defending the statute. They believed in good faith that
arguments could be made. But the Solicitor General, reconsidering
the matter in light of the district court's analysis, concluded that he
could not continue to advocate the statute's constitutionality. The
Attorney General so advised Congress, which subsequently amended
the statute.2 9
On rare occasion the President may sign, and even execute, a law
he considers to be unconstitutional. When that happens, the Solicitor
General is in an odd position. In Oregon v. Mitchell °30 for example,
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold had to determine whether to
defend a provision of the Voting Rights Act31 that lowered the voting
age to eighteen in state and local elections.32 President Nixon
strongly favored lowering the voting age, but as his signing statement
reflected, he "believe[d]-along with most of the Nation's leading
constitutional scholars-that Congress has no power to enact [the
eighteen-year old voting age] by simple statute."'33  Griswold
concluded that reasonable arguments could be made for the statute's
constitutionality, and he defended the voting age provision in the
Supreme Court accordingly. He began his oral argument, however,
28. Id. at 1487.
29. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4454, 111 Stat. 251, 426-32
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (replacing religious sect references in the
Medicare and Medicaid Acts with sect-neutral accommodations for persons relying on a
religious healing method or for whom receiving medical treatment is inconsistent with
their religious beliefs). The amended statute was promptly challenged by the same
plaintiffs and is currently in litigation. See Children's Health Care is a Legal Duty, Inc. v.
Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084, 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court's decision
upholding section 4454 of the Medicare and Medicaid Acts), cert. denied sub nom.
Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. McMullan, 121 S. Ct. 1483 (2001).
30. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
31. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285,84 Stat. 314 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
32. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117.
33. Richard M. Nixon, Statement on Signing the Voting Rights Act of 1970,1970 PUB.
PAPERS 512 (June 22, 1970). The President was supported in this view by the testimony of
two senior Department of Justice officials-Deputy Attorney General Richard
Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist. See Representation of
Congress and Congressional Interests In Court: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 351 (1975)
(statement of Erwin N. Griswold, Solicitor General of the United States) (Sup. Does. No.
Y4. J 89/2: C 76/23) [hereinafter Representation Hearings].
10812001]
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by informing the Court of the views of the President and of the
Department of Justice questioning the statute's constitutionality and
urged the Court to "give consideration to these views."34 In a close
vote, the Court struck down the law. Griswold's approach was lauded
by some as admirable candor; it was attacked by others as half-
hearted advocacy.'
Buckley v. Valeo3 6-the Court's landmark decision on campaign
finance regulation-cast Solicitor General Griswold's successor in an
even more unusual posture. In that case, Solicitor General Robert
Bork and Attorney General Edward Levi filed an eighty-five page
brief in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Attorney General and
the Federal Election Commission as parties.37 The brief elegantly put
forward the best First Amendment defense of the contribution and
expenditure limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act.38
Simultaneously, however, the Attorney General and Solicitor
General filed a separate brief, also persuasive, on behalf of the
Attorney General as appellee and the United States as amicus curiae,
presenting a different, ninety-five page discussion of the First
Amendment issues in a manner that "attempt[ed] to assist in analysis
34. Representation Hearings, supra note 33, at 351 (statement of Erwin N. Griswold,
Solicitor General of the United States).
35. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 2974 (1977) (remarks of Sen. James Abourezk
criticizing the Solicitor General's defense as "lackluster and unenthusiastic").
On another occasion, the Solicitor General's defense of an Act of Congress was
also markedly less than enthusiastic. In Miles v. Graham, the Court invalidated, under the
Compensation Clause, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, Congress's attempt to extend application
of the federal income tax to the salaries of federal judges (even judges who had taken
office after enactment of the tax). 268 U.S. 501, 509 (1925), overruled by O'Malley v.
Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 283 (1939). In defending the constitutionality of the tax,
Solicitor General James M. Beck closed his brief with the following conclusion:
The Solicitor General takes no satisfaction in presenting this argument for the
consideration of the court. He recognizes the painful inadequacy of the salaries
of the Federal Judiciary. It would be a satisfaction to argue that this meager
compensation, to which there is no comparison in any other great and wealthy
nation, should not be diminished by an income tax.
Congress, however, has shown its unmistakable intention to subject these
inadequate salaries to a tax. As able counsel have and will argue the invalidity of
the tax, it is fair to Congress-and, indeed, it is fair to this court-that the other
view of constitutional power should be fully and fairly presented, and this I have
endeavored to do.
Brief for the United States at 28, Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925) (No. 53). Fourteen
years later the Court overruled Miles. O'Malley, 307 U.S. at 283.
36. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
37. Brief for the Attorney General and the FEC at 37, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (No. 75-436).
38. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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without pointing the way to particular conclusions."39
Defending this unusual dual filing, Solicitor General Bork
emphasized that the standing of the Solicitor General before the
Supreme Court
rests ... upon a sense of obligation to the Court and to the
constitutional system so that we often behave less like pure
advocates than do lawyers for private interests.... [lIt
would seem to me not only institutionally unnecessary but a
betrayal of profound obligations to the Court and to
Constitutional processes to take the simplistic position that
whatever Congress enacts we will defend, entirely as
advocates for the client and without an attempt to present
the issues in the round.4"
As was the case with Erwin Griswold in Oregon v. Mitchell, Judge
Bork's approach presented a vision of the Solicitor General's role
considered laudable by some, deplorable by others, but thought-
provoking, I believe, to all.41
I mentioned earlier that there are two important categorical
exceptions to the practice of defending any Act for which reasonable
arguments can be made. I will address these exceptions in a moment,
but first I want to point out that even when neither exception applies,
the Department of Justice has occasionally declined to make
professionally respectable arguments, even when available, to defend
a statute-typically, in cases in which it is manifest that the President
has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional.
In 1990, for example, the United States filed an amicus brief in
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC42 not defending but challenging the
constitutionality of statutory provisions prohibiting the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) from diluting its regulatory
preferences for minority-owned stations.43 Notwithstanding the
United States' advocacy, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
39. Brief of Amici Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States at 8,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (No. 75-436).
40. Letter from Robert H. Bork, Solicitor General, to Simon Lazarus III (Aug. 5,
1975), reprinted in Representation Hearings, supra note 33, at 500-01.
41. For criticism, see, for example, Representation Hearings, supra note 33, at 150,
499-02, 747-49 (documenting letters, testimony, and an editorial submitted by Simon
Lazarus III). The Representation Hearings also include Solicitor General Bork's spirited
defense of his practice. Id.
42. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200,227 (1995).
43. Id. at 551 (upholding sections of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151,301, 303,307,309, which allowed minority preference policies).
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preferences,"I although it later retreated from this decision.45
Similarly, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,6 cable
operators challenged the constitutionality of the "must-carry"
provisions of the Cable Television Act of 1992.47 That law was
enacted over the veto of President Bush, who considered the
provisions unconstitutional.48 When the FCC implemented the
provisions, the Department of Justice informed the district court that
it would not defend their constitutionality, "consistent with President
Bush's veto message. ' 49 President Clinton was then elected, and he
concluded that the provisions should be defended .5  The Justice
Department then did so, and the Supreme Court upheld the law.5 1
Let me turn, finally, to the two recognized exceptions to the
"reasonable argument" presumption. Both exceptions derive directly
from the Solicitor General's duty to account for the interests of all
three branches of government.
The first exception applies when an Act of Congress raises
separation of powers concerns. It is not surprising that the President
and Congress occasionally find themselves at odds regarding the
proper interpretation of their own, and each other's, constitutional
powers. In that event, the Solicitor General ordinarily defends the
President's powers and prerogatives, and Congress traditionally
appears as amicus to present its own views.
The best-known example is INS v. Chadha,52 in which the
Department of Justice declined to defend the constitutionality of the
one-House veto.53  The Solicitor General first exercised this
44. Id. at 600.
45. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
46. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
47. Cable Television Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 634.
48. S. DOC. No. 102-29 (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/3:102-29).
49. Defendant's Motion and Memorandum in Support Thereof for the Issuance of a
Revised Briefing Schedule in this Case and its Related Cases at 2, Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 810 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1992) (No. 92-2247); see also id. at 4.
50. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 38 (D.D.C. 1993) (referring to
the "federal defendants' cross-motion to dismiss" the constitutional challenge).
51. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 668.
52. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
53. Id. at 926. In Chadha, the Solicitor General, representing the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), challenged the constitutionality of a provision that
authorized either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate a decision of the
Executive Branch regarding whether a particular deportable alien could remain in the
United States. Id. When the Department of Justice announced that it would not defend
the provision, the House and Senate intervened, and their counsel argued, unsuccessfully,
for the constitutionality of the Act. Id. at 959.
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prerogative, however, in 1926, in Myers v. United States.54 Myers
involved a statute that limited the President's power to remove
postmasters. 5  The United States sided with Postmaster Myers and
successfully challenged the statute. 6 The Court appointed Senator
George Wharton Pepper to defend the judgment below in favor of
the United States 7 When the postmaster's lawyer rose to begin the
oral argument in the case, he stated:
In the 136 years that have passed since the Constitution was
adopted, there has come before this Court for the first time,
so far as I am able to determine, a case in which the
Government, through the Department of Justice, questions
the constitutionality of its own act. As to that, I have no
criticism to offer; I think it is but proper. We find the
Solicitor General appearing as a representative of the
Executive Department of the Government. And we have
Senator Pepper, as amicus curiae, who ... represents ... the
Legislative branch[] of the Government. I appear as counsel
for the appellant, who brought this suit in the first instance.
It is gratifying to feel that all interests are properly
represented.58
The second exception to the general principle of defending Acts
of Congress-an exception that assumes great significance in light of
the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence-arises when defending
the statute would require the Solicitor General to ask the Supreme
Court to overrule one of its constitutional precedents. 9 In that
instance-when a contrary constitutional ruling is directly on point-
the interests of the legislative and judicial branches are in direct
tension. On the one hand, Congress has made a constitutional
judgment. Yet under Marbury v. Madison,6° the Supreme Court has
the final word on the meaning of the Constitution.61 The Solicitor
General has an obligation to honor the important doctrine of stare
54. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
55. Id. at 56.
56. Id. at 176.
57. Id. at 56.
58. Id- at 57.
59. See, e.g., Nomination of Seth Waxman to be Solicitor General, Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 7 (1997) (statement of Seth Waxman);
Constitutionality of Legislation Withdrawing Supreme Court Jurisdiction to Consider
Cases Relating to Voluntary Prayer, 6 Op. O.L.C. 13, 26 (1982) (The Department of
Justice will not necessarily defend a statute where "prior precedent overwhelmingly
indicates that the statute is invalid.").
60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
61. Id. at 177.
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decisis and a duty to respect the rulings of the Court. Those
responsibilities are at least commensurate with the Solicitor General's
duty to respect congressional determinations about a statute's
constitutionality.
Most commonly, cases falling under this exception involve
statutes whose constitutionality has been undermined by Supreme
Court decisions rendered after the law's enactment. 62 Congress, after
all, rarely defies a Supreme Court ruling. For example, in recognition
of the Court's new jurisprudence, the Department of Justice recently
notified Congress twelve times during a single year that, in light of
intervening judicial precedents, it could no longer defend a statutory
provision that the legislature and the Executive might have
considered constitutional at the time of enactment. Two terms ago,
for example, in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United
States,63 the Court struck down a longstanding federal prohibition
against casino advertising by broadcasters located in states that
permit casino gambling.64 Formally, the Court did not resolve
whether the prohibition could still be applied to advertisements that
originate in states that do not permit such gambling.65 But after
reviewing the opinion, I concluded that the Court's reasoning could
not sustain such a distinction. We advised Congress that we could no
longer defend the constitutionality of the prohibition anywhere.66
Similarly, in a case called Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,67 the Court held
that Congress lacks the power to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity against private damage awards for violation of the federal
patent laws.68 Other cases pending around the country involved a
62. See, e.g., Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Albert Gore, Jr., President
of the Senate (Oct. 13, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (explaining
that the Department of Justice would withdraw from the litigation defending the
abrogation of state immunity from a copyright violation suit in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions upholding state immunity in similar suits); Letter from Seth P. Waxman,
Solicitor General, to Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate (Aug. 6, 1999) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) (explaining that the Department of Justice could no
longer defend legislation barring truthful gambling advertising in the wake of a Supreme
Court decision permitting lottery advertising by stations in states where such gambling was
legal).
63. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
64. Id. at 175-76.
65. Id. at 194.
66. Letter from Seth P. Waxman, Solicitor General, to Albert Gore, Jr., President of
the Senate (Aug. 6, 1999).
67. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
68. Id at 647.
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similar abrogation provision in the copyright law.69 A footnote in
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion suggested that the Court's
rationale in the patent context might not inexorably apply in the
copyright context.70 That suggestion inspired me to the limits of my
creative faculties. But after exhaustively considering the matter, I
simply could not find an appropriate argument consistent with the
Court's reasoning in the patent case. Our letter to Congress did leave
open the possibility of defending similar provisions if enacted after
further congressional inquiry and findings.71
I do not mean to suggest that a Solicitor General may never ask
the Court to reconsider constitutional precedent. Although the long-
range interests of the United States caution extreme restraint, the
Solicitor General, like any litigant, can always ask the Court to
overrule a precedent. In 1950, for example, Solicitor General Philip
Perlman asked the Court to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson.2 Similarly,
four years ago, in Agostini v. Felton,73 the Solicitor General asked the
Court to overrule an Establishment Clause holding it had rendered
over a decade earlier in the very same case.74 These are isolated
exceptions, however, that prove the general rule.
And that brings me back to where I began-Dickerson v. United
States.75 As we told Speaker Hastert in response to his letter, the
decision not to defend a statute, and indeed to advocate against it,
should be a rare and solemn act.76 But as we saw it, the Supreme
Court's repeated, consistent application of Miranda to the States
could only mean that the doctrine is a constitutional one; and because
69. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1998) (striking down
provisions of the Copyright Act seeking to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
70. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 658 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Albert Gore, Jr., President of the
Senate (Oct. 13,1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
72. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that the Constitution permitted separate railway cars
for black and white passengers). The United States first urged that Plessy be overruled in
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 823 (1950). See Brief for the United States at 12,
23-66, Henderson (No. 25). For a general account of this decision, see Seth P. Waxman,
Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 IND. LJ. 1297, 1306-
08 (2000).
73. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
74. Id. at 203. The earlier case was styled Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). For
a description of the unique procedural history of Agostini-in which, in response to a
motion filed by under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
reexamined its earlier judgment in the very same case-see Brief for the United States at
6-8, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (No. 96-552).
75. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
76. Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Dennis P. Hastert, Speaker of the
House of Representatives (Mar. 17,2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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the statute in question could not be reconciled with Miranda, it could
constitutionally be applied only if the Court were to overrule Miranda
and the dozens of cases that have followed, applied, and extended the
landmark decision.7 Taking into account all of the factors informing
the doctrine of stare decisis, and all of the interests of the United
States, neither the Attorney General nor I could conclude that
Miranda should be overruled. We discussed our conclusion with the
President, and he agreed.
Our decision was vociferously criticized by some. But our briefs
in the Supreme Court presented the arguments on both sides of the
issue and explained the basis for our conclusion.7" I tried as hard as I
could to file a brief that best reflected the long-range interest of the
United States, as a government and as a people. Certain Members of
Congress filed amicus briefs, as did many other interested parties, and
all perspectives on the question were thoroughly joined and
presented to the Supreme Court. The Court agreed with the position
of the United States in an opinion authored by the Chief Justice and
joined by six of his colleagues.79
Any decision not to defend the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress tests the mettle of the Solicitor General. That is as it should
be. Confronting issues of such moment, I took instruction and solace
from Francis Biddle, who observed, following his own tenure in office
that, so long as the Solicitor General maintains fidelity to the rule of
law, he "has no master to serve except his country." 0 This country is
quite a master. And what a privilege it was to be its servant.
77. When the statute in question was enacted in 1968, the ninetieth Congress
acknowledged that it was inconsistent with governing Supreme Court precedent; indeed,
Congress's disagreement with the Court's constitutional view was the very reason for the
statute's enactment. See Brief for the United States at 18-20, United States v. Dickerson,
530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525) (citing legislative references). The only recent analogy
is the federal Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 700 (1994)), enacted in the wake of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989),
which the Court invalidated in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,319 (1990).
78. See Brief for the United States at 11-50, Dickerson (No. 99-5525).
79. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 (2000).
80. BIDDLE, supra note 13, at 98.
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